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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. APPELLEE ERRS IN ASSERTING 
THERE IS ONLY ONE ISSUE ON APPEAL 
As was set forth in Appellant's Petition for Permission to 
Appeal Interlocutory Order and in the Appellant's Brief, there are 
numerous issues presented for review in this case. Those issues 
include whether Appellant's attorney-client privilege with her 
attorneys in another case were "waived" by filing this case; 
whether Judge Young's specific finding that Rule 504, Utah Rules of 
Evidence, is applicable to this case and supported a "waiver" of 
the attorney-client privilege; whether Judge Young's specific 
indication that Appellee's counsel's desire to determine if he 
could impeach Appellant outweighed Appellant's attorney-client 
privilege; whether Appellant's attorney-client privilege ended at 
the conclusion of her former domestic lawsuit; and whether Judge 
Young's ruling violated Rule 504 and U.C.A. §78-24-8(2). 
Appellee's Brief suggests that the "sole" issue is whether 
Appellant waived the attorney-client privilege by testifying in her 
deposition about communications with her former attorneys. While 
it is certainly understandable that Appellee would like to limit 
consideration by this Court to that "sole" issue, the issues set 
forth above by Appellant are absolutely relevant to this appeal, 
and the "sole" issue suggested by Appellee was not even one of the 
bases relied upon by Judge Young in granting the motion compelling 
Appellant's former attorneys to testify. 
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It is absolutely indisputable that Judge Young heavily relied 
on his belief that even the potential of impeaching Appellant 
justified the elimination of her attorney-client privilege. The 
entire transcript of the hearing in which Judge Young's rulings 
were made has been provided to this Court (R. 292-349). In the 
hearing, Judge Young indicated that "jiff she [appellant] says that 
the trial went thus and such way, and the lawyer says it didn't, 
that's pretty credible information and it can be brought into 
court." (R. 310, emphasis added). Judge Young continued: 
And I don't understand how it can be now that she hasn't 
waived the privilege by filing this, by the nature of 
this lawsuit. For instance, ±JE_ the lawyer were to 
testify that she didn't relinquish custody on the basis 
of this released information, that she did it on whatever 
other basis, then that would be very credible and 
important information. There is no other way to the 
defense to get that except through the testimony of the 
lawyer. 
(.Id., emphasis added). Although the undersigned pointed out to 
Judge Young that Appellant's veracity could be tested in a number 
of other ways including taking the depositions of her ex-husband, 
her ex-husband's attorney, other family members, obtaining the 
custody evaluation report, etc., Judge Young maintained that the 
possibility of Appellant's attorneys giving a different story than 
Appellant did was so "important" to the Appellee's efforts at 
impeachment that it justified doing away with the attorney-client 
privilege. 
Judge Young stated: "Now, if there is any potential that the 
attorney would countermand that or claim that it occurred for 
another reason, where else would the defendants get that 
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information?" (R. 342). It is clear that Judge Young!s main 
concern was that the defendant!s (Appellee) "right to impeach" 
Appellant was more important than the attorney-client privilege. 
He further stated: 
How can they [defendants] protect themselves in 
investigating this case in the two areas, both the 
release of the information and its effect on damages? Ijf 
in fact the attorney would come forward and say—which 
they won't—but if the attorney would come forward and 
say, that really didn't have anything to do with it, she 
lost them because of a drug habit, or whatever else— 
that's out of, maybe, the evaluation. I am making that 
up, of course. I am not assuming that fact. But if 
that's so, why wouldn't they be entitled to discovery. 
Then after discovery, then you can file a motion for 
protective order on the basis that it has no bearing on 
the case, request in limine that it's not relevant. 
(R. 323-24, emphasis added). 
It is clear that Judge Young did not have any evidence that 
Appellant was lying or could be impeached, and that he believed the 
"possibility" of impeachment outweighed her attorney-client 
privilege. As set forth in Appellant's Brief, this is totally 
contradictory to Utah case law and the legislative mandate that the 
attorney-client privilege be preserved "inviolate." 
It is also clear that Judge Young's belief that Appellant had 
"waived" the privilege was not as a result of any of the brief 
statements she made in her deposition about discussions with her 
former counsel. Rather, Judge Young indicated that the "waiver" 
occurred simply because Appellant had filed a lawsuit which had 
related issues to her earlier divorce case. Judge Young 
specifically indicated that "I don't understand how it can be now 
that she hasn't waived the privilege by filing this, by the nature 
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of this lawsuit." (R. 310, emphasis added). Nowhere in Judge 
Young's ruling did he indicate that a waiver had occurred because 
of anything Appellant said in her deposition. Appellee obviously 
wishes such had been the basis of Judge Young!s ruling because 
Appellee dedicates almost her entire Brief to an argument that 
statements made by Appellant in her deposition waived the attorney-
client privilege. However, that was not the basis of Judge Young1s 
decision. It is interesting to note that even Appellee concedes 
such was not the basis of Judge Young's ruling as the final point 
of Appellee's Brief is titled: "That the Trial Court did not 
Express all its Reasons for Granting the Motion to Compel Does not 
Preclude This Court from Upholding the Decision on Other Grounds." 
In order to address Appellee's points in order, this argument will 
be discussed in more detail below. 
POINT II. THE STATEMENT OF FACTS IN APPELLEE'S 
BRIEF IS ERRONEOUS, VIOLATIVE OF LAW, 
AND SHOULD RESULT IN SANCTIONS 
In paragraph 9 of the "Statement of Facts" in Appellee's 
Brief, Appellee referred to Appellant's "Notice of Intent to 
Commence Malpractice Action" served on September 17, 1994, and 
quoted part of that Notice of Intent. The entire Notice of Intent 
was also attached to Appellee's Brief as Addendum B. 
In enacting the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act (U.C.A. §78-
14-1, et seg.) the Legislature made it abundantly clear how 
important confidentiality of the proceedings are. In U.C.A. §78-
14-8, the Legislature mandated that medical malpractice actions 
must be initiated by serving a "Notice of Intent to Commence an 
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Action," and also indicated that such a notice "may be in letter or 
affidavit form executed by the plaintiff or his attorney." In 
discussing the prelitigation process, the Legislature also mandated 
that "proceedings conducted under authority of this section are 
confidential, privileged, and immune from civil process." (U.C.A. 
§78-14-12(1)(d), emphasis added). The Legislature also mandated 
that "the proceedings are confidential and closed to the public," 
(U.C.A. §78-14-13(5)(a)). 
Because U.C.A. §78-14-12(2)(b) requires that a party's request 
for prelitigation panel review "shall include a copy of the Notice 
of Intent to Commence Action," the Prelitigation Panel always uses 
the Notice of Intent in the proceedings. Indeed, that Notice 
serves as the basis for the hearing, much as a Complaint does in 
civil actions before courts. The Legislature specifically 
indicated that notices of intent and all other evidence used in 
prelitigation proceedings are inadmissible: 
Evidence of the proceedings conducted by the medical 
review panel and its results, opinions, findings, and 
determinations are not admissible as evidence in an 
action subsequently brought by the claimant in a court of 
competent jurisdiction. 
U.C.A. §78-14-15(1). By quoting from Appellant's Notice of Intent 
and by attaching it as an exhibit to her Brief, Appellee has openly 
violated the Act's requirements that all evidence associated with 
the proceedings are inadmissible, and that all materials and 
evidence related to the hearing are "confidential, privileged, and 
immune from civil process." 
Not only did Appellee originally release extremely 
5 
confidential materials which led to the filing of this case, she 
has now, for a second time, released documents which are 
"confidential, privileged, and immune from civil process." This 
Court should impose significant sanctions such as striking 
Appellee's entire brief and/or dismissing Appellee's opposition to 
this Appeal, and Appellant hereby requests such sanctions. 
In paragraph 3 of the Statement of Facts, Appellee also makes 
the erroneous representation that the hearing before Commissioner 
Evans was "to determine custody of plaintiff's children." It is 
undisputed, however, that the hearing in which Appellant's medical 
records were divulged was held on January 19, 1994, in response to 
Appellant's "Application for Ex-Parte Protective Order" filed on 
January 3, 1994. While a wife's application for a protective order 
against her gun-toting husband would certainly involve temporary 
custody of the children during the period of the protective order, 
Appellant's ex-husband's Complaint for Divorce in which, for the 
first time, one of the parties actually sought legal custody of the 
children, was not even filed until January 21, 1994—two days after 
the hearing in question was held. 
POINT III. THE BASES USED FOR THE TRIAL 
COURT'S ERRONEOUS RULING WERE IMPROPER 
As indicated above, almost the entirety of Appellee's Brief is 
dedicated to the argument that by testifying regarding a few of her 
conversations with her former attorneys, Appellant "waived" her 
attorney-client privilege. However, that is not the basis for 
Judge Young's ruling. The court's ruling specifically stated that 
"the court further finds that the issue of the attorney-client 
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privilege has been waived by the plaintiff, and that Rule 504 
applies to this waiver." No other findings were made. 
It is clear what Judge Young was basing his "waiver" argument 
on because he specified in the hearing that "I don't understand how 
it can be now that she hasn't waived the privilege by filing this, 
by the nature of this lawsuit." (R. 310). The Court did not make 
any findings or base its rulings on a "waiver" because of what 
Appellant said in her deposition. Although the bases which the 
Court did rely on will be addressed in this section of Appellant's 
Brief, Appellee's "waiver" argument regarding Appellant's 
deposition testimony will also be addressed below. 
As was set forth at pages 15-16 of Appellant's first Brief, 
courts at every level, including the United States Supreme Court, 
have unequivocally held that the attorney-client privilege extends 
to subsequent litigation. This is so, even if such communications 
are directly related to the present suit. See, e.g., Zenith Radio 
Corp. v. United States, 764 F.2d 1577 (C.A. Fed. 1985), in which 
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit held that "the 
attorney-client privilege promotes confidential relations that may 
well deal with the very suit in question." (id. at 1580, quoting 
4 Moore's Federal Practice, Section 26.60[6](2d ed. 1984)). The 
Court also emphasized that "a party does not automatically waive 
these privileges, which protect the formulation of legal opinions 
or legal strategy, simply by bringing suit." Id. 
The filing of subsequent litigation does not waive an 
attorney-client privilege which existed in a prior case, even if it 
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is related to the second action. If the filing of a second action 
"waived" attorney-client privileges from previous actions, no one 
would ever dare file an action having previously been a party. The 
Utah Constitution's guarantee that courts "shall be open" and that 
a party may prosecute or defend "any civil cause to which he is a 
party" would be severely compromised. Judge Young's belief that a 
"waiver" occurred by filing a lawsuit with arguably related issues 
is simply wrong. 
It is also clear from the quotes set forth above that Judge 
Young repeatedly indicated his belief that even without any proof 
whatsoever, the "possibility" that Appellant's testimony might 
differ from her counsel's testimony justified eliminating her 
attorney-client privilege. The undersigned has not been able to 
find any case in any jurisdiction which has even suggested such an 
approach. Even Appellee does not make any attempt in her Brief to 
justify that approach. 
If the "possibility" of impeaching a person outweighed the 
attorney-client privilege, this would also make the above-
referenced "open court's provision" of the Utah Constitution 
meaningless. No one would ever file more than one case in his or 
her lifetime because of the fear that "possible impeachment" might 
erase the attorney-client privilege from a previous case. The 
Legislature's mandate that the attorney-client privilege be 
"preserved inviolate" would likewise be meaningless. 
This was all pointed out to Judge Young and he obviously 
recognized the problematic nature of this, but apparently felt he 
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could justify his decision by stating that after the attorneys' 
depositions, he "would invite from counsel for the plaintiff a 
motion in limine or a protective order." (R. 345). Repairing a 
violation of the attorney-client privilege in such an "after-the-
fact" manner would violate Utah statutory and case law, and has 
never been approved by any court. If this important privilege is 
to be preserved "inviolate," it must be enforced before the 
privilege is violated. 
Finally, Judge Young's ruling makes it clear that he was 
relying upon Rule 504, Utah Rules of Evidence, as the basis for his 
ruling. While Appellee argues throughout most of her Brief that 
Rule 507 is actually what Judge Young must have been relying on, 
Appellee does include two paragraphs in her Brief in an attempt to 
argue that Rule 504 might apply. 
First, Appellee refers to the definition of "confidential" 
under Rule 504(a) which indicates that 
A communication is "confidential" if not intended to be 
disclosed to third persons other than those to whom 
disclosure is in furtherance of the rendition of 
professional legal services to the client or those 
reasonably necessary for the transmission of the 
communication. 
Appellee suggests that what Appellant said in her deposition is not 
"confidential" because "she voluntarily testified about them to 
third persons in her deposition." The issue is not whether 
Appellant's communications in her deposition are "confidential." 
The issue is whether what plaintiff discussed with her former 
divorce attorneys is confidential. Those communications certainly 
qualify as confidential because, as is evident, they were "not 
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intended to be disclosed to third-parties other than those to whom 
disclosure is in furtherance of the rendition of professional legal 
services to the client." This is obvious from the fact that 
Appellant's former attorneys refused to testify at a deposition 
(which necessitated Appellee's Motion to Compel), and the fact 
Appellee also filed a Motion for a Protective Order to prevent 
those depositions from being held. 
Subparagraph (b) of Rule 504 supports Appellant's position in 
this case by mandating that "a client has a privilege to refuse to 
disclose and to prevent any other person from disclosing 
confidential information made for the purpose of facilitating the 
rendition of professional legal services . . . ." The "exceptions" 
to that general Rule are set forth in subparagraph (d) of the Rule 
and are listed as (1) "Furtherance of crime or fraud," (2) 
"Claimants through same deceased client," (3) "Breach of duty by 
lawyer or client," (4) "Document attested by lawyer" and (5) "Joint 
clients." Appellee's Brief refers only to the third of these 
exceptions which states that no privilege exists under the Rule "as 
to a communication relevant to an issue of breach of duty by the 
lawyer to the client or by the client to the lawyer." Appellant 
has made no claim that her former lawyers breached a duty to her, 
and the lawyers certainly have made no claim that she breached a 
duty to them. Appellee's Brief makes the incredible leap that it 
is "likely" that the former attorneys may be on the jury verdict 
form if this case goes to trial (even though in more than three 
years of litigation, no one has even suggested putting them on the 
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jury verdict form). Appellee then makes another leap by stating 
that "implicit in plaintiff's claim for damages in this case is 
that her formers attorney breached their duty to plaintiff." 
(Appellee's Brief at p.22, emphasis added). Such is not "implicit" 
in plaintiff!s claim for damages, neither plaintiff nor her former 
attorneys have ever even hinted at such a breach of duty, and 
Appellee cannot force Appellant or her attorneys to "implicitly" 
make such a claim just to make Rule 504(d) apply. However, even if 
it did apply, it is clear Judge Young did not rely upon that 
portion of the Rule or even bring it up at any point in the 
hearing. Rule 504 simply does not apply to this case, and Judge 
Young erred in using it as the basis for his decision. 
POINT IV. THE PRIVILEGE WAS NOT WAIVED UNDER RULE 507. 
As indicated above, almost the entirety of Appellee!s Brief 
argues that Rule 507, Utah Rules of Evidence, is applicable to this 
case and justifies the finding that Appellant "waived" her 
attorney-client privilege. Although that Rule was not used by the 
trial Court as a basis for its decision, Appellant will respond to 
Appellee's argument in the event this Court chooses to consider it. 
Rule 507 indicates as follows: 
(a) A person upon whom these rules confer a privilege 
against disclosure of the confidential matter or 
communication waives the privilege if the person or a 
predecessor while holder of the privilege voluntarily 
discloses or consents to the disclosure of any 
significant part of the matter or communication, or fails 
to take reasonable precautions against inadvertent 
disclosure. This rule does not apply if the disclosure 
is itself a privileged communication. 
(b) Evidence of a statement or other disclosure of 
privileged matter is not admissible against the holder of 
the privilege if disclosure was 
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(1) compelled erroneously or 
(2) made without opportunity to claim the 
privilege. 
(Emphasis added). 
Appellee does not contest that Appellant's conversations with 
her former attorneys are protected by the attorney-client 
privilege. Appellee does not contest that by statute, the 
privilege must be preserved "inviolate." Appellee only suggests 
that by talking about limited conversations with her divorce 
attorneys in her deposition, Appellant "waived" the privilege. 
The first question is whether Appellant "voluntarily" and 
knowingly disclosed privileged information. Even if that hurdle is 
overcome, the above quoted Rule requires that the disclosure be of 
"significant" matters. Finally, the Court must look at whether 
"reasonable precautions" against inadvertent disclosure were made. 
Although Appellee's Brief refers to bits and pieces of 
Appellantfs deposition wherein she discussed her former attorneys, 
Appellee has not acknowledged to this Court the full picture of 
what happened at the deposition, what was said and objections which 
were made. Appellant's deposition began on September 19, 1996. At 
the end of that day, Appellant's deposition was not yet finished so 
the deposition was reconvened until October 17, 1996. 
The first 160 pages of the deposition transcript reflect 
questioning by Philip S. Ferguson (counsel for defendant Heifer who 
has settled out of this case), and Terrence L. Rooney, counsel for 
Appellee. Not once during the questioning by those two defendants 
were questions asked regarding conversations between Appellant and 
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her former attorneys. Beginning on page 161 of the deposition 
transcript, Keith A. Kelly, counsel for defendant Psychiatric 
Associates, Inc. (which has also paid to settle out of this case), 
began questioning. Almost immediately upon Mr. Kelly beginning his 
questioning, the following exchange occurred: 
Q. Did you talk to your attorney about the threat that 
he [Appellant's former husband] made to you? 
MR. SCHWAB: Wait a minute, don't answer that. You have 
no right to know what she's talked to me about. I am 
instructing you not to answer. 
(Appellant's deposition at pp.162-63). 
Mr. Kelly then shifted his questioning to discuss the hearing 
on January 19, 1994, in which Appellant was unrepresented by 
counsel. The testimony occurred which is quoted on page 12 of 
Appellee's Brief. The Court will note that that questioning deals 
only with the creation of the attorney-client relationship and does 
not go into any substantive matters discussed between attorney and 
client. Appellant simply indicated that attorney Stuart Ralphs 
came up to her at the hearing and volunteered to help her, that she 
went out in the hall and talked with him, and that she told Mr. 
Ralphs that she did not have any idea her husband had the records 
prior to the hearing. Copies of the deposition transcript pages in 
question are attached hereto as Appendix "A." After this 
testimony, the following exchange took place in the deposition: 
Q. Do you recall him [attorney Ralphs] saying anything 
else to you or you saying anything else to him? 
MR. SCHWAB: Just a minute. The problem I have got with 
this, Keith, is you are clearly going into things that 
are prohibited by attorney-client privilege. 
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Id. at p. 164. A long discussion then occurred which Appellee has 
cited on page 13 of her Brief in which the attorney-client 
privilege and related issues were explained to Appellant. 
Appellant then indicated at the bottom of page of 165 of the 
deposition transcript that she needed to talk with her attorney 
(the undersigned) before going further. A recess was then taken. 
After the recess, the undersigned went back on the record and 
indicated that he had explained the attorney-client privilege to 
Appellant. He then stated that "she [Appellant] has decided to 
assert the attorney-client privilege as to all conversations 
between her and her counsel." Id. at 166, emphasis added. Mr. 
Kelly then made the following statement: 
MR. KELLY: You can assert the privilege or not assert the 
privilege as you choose, but what I am understanding you to 
say is if I ask any questions about communications she had 
with attorneys who helped her in her divorce action you will 
assert attorney-client privilege, is that correct? 
MR. SCHWAB: That is correct. Although we respect your 
opinion, we disagree with it. I believe any conversations 
with an attorney, whether it be in the current litigation or 
previous litigation is still protected by the attorney-client 
privilege. If I am wrong, then I guess we will let the Judge 
tell me I am wrong but as for this deposition, we are 
asserting that privilege and she will not be talking about 
those conversations. 
Id at pp. 166-67. Mr. Kelly then indicated (p. 167, lines 9-15) 
that he felt it was important to ask the questions in order to make 
a record. The following statement was then made by the undersigned: 
MR. SCHWAB: That!s fine. Maybe to save some time, 
rather than having me object after each question, I will 
just state that in order not to waive the attorney-client 
privilege we don't feel that we can talk about any 
conversations between Crystal and her attorney/ 
especially regarding the divorce litigation that you are 
talking about. 
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Id. at 167, emphasis added. 
Appellee's Brief fails to even point out to the Court that 
this continuing objection was entered on the record. Indeed, 
Appellee represents to the Court after each alleged example of 
waiver that "no objection was made and no privilege was asserted." 
Appellant hopes that these representations were made because of 
Appellee's counsel's forgetting that the continuing objection had 
been entered, and not because of any intent to mislead this Court. 
Appellee's Brief asserts that the next "waiver" of the 
attorney-client privilege occurred on page 184 of the deposition. 
That conversation is as follows and did not address the substantive 
issues being dealt with in this case: 
Q. And isn't it true that you authorized Ms. Dyer to 
accept service of that divorce complaint? 
A. Yes. 
Q. So prior to the time that she signed this document, 
you had met with her and you knew she was going to 
be your attorney? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And did she tell you that your husband was going to 
file a divorce complaint? 
A, I am sure she did, yes. 
Q. And what were the concerns that you had at that 
time in the divorce action? 
A. I didn't want to lose my kids. I told her that I 
wanted my children. 
Q. Did you care whether you got a divorce? 
A. No, I wanted a divorce but I didn't ask for the 
divorce. 
Id. at 184-85, emphasis added. As indicated above, counsel for 
Appellant had specifically made a continuing objection to any 
questions regarding communications between Appellant and her former 
attorneys. Indicating that she had authorized Ms. Dyer to accept 
service of the divorce complaint and that Ms. Dyer had told 
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Appellant her husband was going to file a divorce complaint 
obviously deals with procedural "peripheral" matters for which 
there is no attorney-client privilege. Appellant's statement that 
"I told her I wanted my children" was not responsive to the 
question that Mr. Kelly had posed and the undersigned did not need 
to restate an objection because a continuing objection had already 
been noted. 
Appellee's next alleged example of waiver occurred 12 pages 
later (p. 196) of Appellant's deposition. However, Appellee only 
quotes the answer in her Brief. The questions leading up to the 
answer are as follows: 
Q. And in your lawsuit, in your divorce lawsuit at 
that time and, in fact, throughout the time period 
from the time you answered the complaint through 
the end of September, you were seeking to keep your 
kids and keep them in your marital home, weren't 
you? 
A. Yes, I was. 
Q. For you to have possession of the home and be able 
to live there with your kids. Right? 
A. But I was also afraid of the fact that my husband 
was going to tell my children and I thought about 
that since the day that it happened, and I 
discussed it with my attorney and she told me if I 
ever gave up custody of my children there would 
probably be no way to get them back. So I was 
fighting with the pros and cons of protecting them 
from what he would say or knowing that I would 
never have my kids. 
Id. pp. 195-196. As can be seen, the brief statement made by 
Appellant was in no way responsive to Mr. Kelly's question as to 
whether Appellant wanted to keep possession of her home and live 
with her children. Furthermore, because of the continuing 
objection previously stated, no objection needed to be made again. 
Appellee's next alleged example of a "waiver" was discussed on 
16 
page 15 of her Brief. Because of the length of the quote in 
Appellee's Brief, the Court is simply referred to that quote. The 
Court will note from that quote that Appellant's answers were 
either not responsive to the question asked or that the questions 
simply involved Mr. Kelly's suggested scenarios which Appellant 
denied even occurred. In answering those scenarios, Appellant did 
not indicate what she actually told her attorneys, but simply told 
Mr. Kelly that the scenarios he was suggesting did not occur. 
Again, however, it is important to remember that a continuing 
objection had already entered into the record. 
Appellee's final alleged "waiver" is discussed on page 16 of 
Appellee's Brief. It is obvious, however, that again, only 
peripheral issues were being discussed. In this case, it was the 
timing of the settlement: 
Q. So it was just right before October 24, 1994 that 
you told your attorney that you would agree to give 
up custody and settle the divorce case? 
A. No, I don't think so, I think we talked in his 
office. 
Q. A day or two before the hearing on the 24th? 
A. Yes. 
This was simply an indication of timing as to when the decision to 
settle was made. Again, the continuing objection was still in 
place. 
Appellee also fails to point out that after these exchanges, 
one other attempt by Mr. Kelly occurred to discuss communications 
between Appellant and her attorney: 
Q. Did she [Appellant's former attorney] discuss with 
you that because of your protective order complaint that 
there might be an argument that you had waived or given 
up the privilege to hold those documents as being 
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private? 
A. No. 
MR. SCHWAB: Hold on just a second. I think in my mind 
you have crossed the line. I have been trying to be as 
lax as I could for the sake of moving this case forward 
letting you talk about what she and her attorney 
discussed as far as procedural matters. I believe the 
question crosses the line and gets into the merits of 
what they were discussing regarding the case and 
strategy. I believe that crosses the line. In addition 
to the attorney-client privilege, I don't think that is 
an appropriate question. 
Q. (Mr. Kelly) Are you going to follow your counsel's 
advice on that point? 
A. Yes. 
Id. at 211. No further discussions regarding attorney-client 
communications were discussed beyond that point. 
It is clear from viewing the entirety of the deposition 
transcript that Appellant did not intend to waive the attorney-
client privilege. Both at the beginning of Mr. Kelly's questions 
and toward the end of Mr. Kelly's questions, Appellant specifically 
told him that she intended to follow her counsel's advice and not 
answer questions violative of the attorney-client privilege. 
Appellant's counsel did not need to object to every question 
because a continuing objection was stated before any such questions 
were answered. Most, if not all, of the statements made by 
Appellant after the continuing objection was entered were either 
nonresponsive to the question or only dealt with peripheral matters 
which were not "significant." 
Even if Appellant's counsel would not have made the continuing 
objection, a party may object to the use of anything said in his or 
her deposition even up to the time of trial. Rule 32(c)(3)(B) 
specifies that objections are reserved until the time of trial 
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other than the form of questions and other exceptions not 
applicable to this case. This Court has specifically interpreted 
that Rule for the proposition that specific objections which a 
party might have made to testimony given in a deposition were not 
waived by failure to object at the time of the deposition, and 
could be asserted at the time of trial: 
Under Rule 32(b) and (d)(3)(A), U.R.C.P., as amended 
1972, defendant's asserted objections could have been 
made at the trial and they were not waived by failure to 
make them during the course of the deposition. 
Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City v. Barrutia, 526 P.2d 47, 50 
(Utah 1974). Appellant could object to the admissibility of any of 
the deposition questions up to the time of trial, but this is a 
moot point because the continuing objection was made at the 
beginning of Mr. Kelly's questioning. 
POINT V. CASE LAW REQUIRES PRESERVING 
THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THIS CASE. 
More than four decades ago, this Court explained that 
challenges to the attorney-client privilege needed to be reviewed 
on a case-by-case basis in order to determine the intent of the 
party claiming the privilege. In Evans v. Evans, 8 Utah 2d 26, 327 
P. 2d 260 (1958), this Court held that 
The circumstances are to indicate whether by implication 
the communication was of a sort intended to be 
confidential. These circumstances will of course vary in 
individual cases, and the ruling must therefore depend 
much on the case in hand. 
Id. at 261, emphasis added. 
There can be no question in this case what Appellant intended. 
After discussing the matter with her counsel, Appellant indicated, 
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on the record, that she intended to follow her counsel's advice and 
not waive the attorney-client privilege. Her counsel repeated this 
intention and made a continuing objection before any of the alleged 
"waiver" statements were made. On at least two occasions after 
that in the deposition, Appellant again reaffirmed her intent not 
to waiver her privilege and to keep communications about 
substantive matters confidential. When Appellee later indicated a 
desire to take her former attorneys1 depositions, Appellant 
immediately filed a Motion for a Protective Order and when Appellee 
filed a Motion to Compel, Appellant opposed that Motion. 
More than 30 years after the Evans decision was issued, this 
Court again addressed the attorney-client privilege in the case of 
Gold Standard, Inc. v. American Barrick Resources Corp., 801 P.2d 
909 (Utah 1990). In that case, the Court acknowledged that U.C.A. 
§78-24-8(2) provides: 
An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be 
examined as to any communication made by the client to 
him or his advice given regarding the communication in 
the course of his professional employment. 
Id. at 911. The Court also made the important distinction between 
attorney-client discussions involving substantive matters and those 
involving "peripheral" issues. The Court explained that 
discussions involving the retention of attorneys, the reasons why 
an attorney is being engaged, etc. are to be distinguished from 
substantive discussions: 
Retainer agreements are not generally protected by the 
attorney-client privilege. The items contained in them, 
describing the external trappings of the attorney-client 
relationship, are not confidential. See e.g., In re TV 
Securities Litigation, 89 F.R.D. 595, 603 (N.D. Tex. 
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1981) ("terms and conditions of an attorney*s employment, 
the purpose for which an attorney has been engaged, and 
the steps which an attorney took or intended to take in 
discharging his obligation" not protected). 
Id. at 911-12, emphasis added. Appellant invites the Court to look 
closely at the statements made in her deposition which Appellee 
asserts constitute a "waiver." Appellant strongly believes that 
most, if not all, of those statements involve such "external 
trappings of the attorney-client relationship." Those that may not 
fit into this category were nonresponsive to questions and even if 
they had been, a continuing objection had been entered before any 
of the statements were made. 
In the case of Askew v. Hardman, 918 P.2d 469 (Utah 1996), 
this Court addressed the parameters of the related work product 
doctrine. The Court ruled: "We find the case-by-case approach more 
sound in determining whether documents in an insurance claim file 
were prepared in anticipation of litigation." Id. at 474. 
Subsequent to all of these decisions, the United States 
Supreme Court recently strengthened the protection of the attorney-
client privilege and warned against using "balancing tests" to 
weaken the privilege. In the landmark case of Swidler & Berlin v. 
U.S. , 118 S. Ct. 2081 (1998), the Court addressed the well-
publicized case of White House Counsel Vincent Foster, and whether 
independent counsel James Hamilton could breach the attorney-client 
privilege after Foster!s death. 
The Court began its analysis by emphasizing that "the 
attorney-client privilege is one of the oldest recognized 
privileges for confidential communications," and also that "the 
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privilege is intended to encourage full and frank communication 
between attorneys and their clients." Id., at 2084. The 
Independent Counsel in the Swidler case made the same arguments 
regarding possible conflicting testimony and perjury made by 
Appellee (and relied upon by the trial court) in this case: 
The Independent Counsel suggests, however, that his 
proposed exception would have little to no effect on the 
client's willingness to confide in his attorney. He 
reasons that only clients intending to perjure themselves 
will be chilled by a rule of disclosure after death, as 
opposed to truthful clients or those asserting their 
Fifth Amendment privilege. This is because for the 
latter group, communications disclosed by the attorney 
after the client's death purportedly will reveal only 
information that the client himself would have revealed 
if alive. 
The Independent Counsel assumes, incorrectly we believe, 
that the privilege is analogous to the Fifth Amendment's 
protection against self-incrimination. But as suggested 
above, the privilege serves much broader purposes. 
Clients consult with attorneys for a wide variety of 
reasons, only one of which involves possible criminal 
liability. 
. . . 
The contention that the attorney is being required to 
disclose only what the client could have been required to 
disclose is at odds with the basis for the privilege even 
during the client's lifetime. In related cases, we have 
said that the loss of evidence admittedly caused by the 
privilege is justified in part by the fact that without 
the privilege, the client may not have made such 
communications in the first place. 
Id. at 2086, emphasis added. The Court then made the following 
significant explanation: 
A client may not know at the time he discloses 
information to his attorney whether it will later be 
relevant to a civil or a criminal matter, let alone 
whether it will be of substantial importance. Balancing 
ex post the importance of the information against client 
interests, even limited to criminal cases, introduces 
substantial uncertainty into the privilege's application. 
For lust that reason we have rejected use of a balancing 
test in defining the contours of the privilege. 
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Id. at 2087, emphasis added. The Court then concluded as follows: 
Finally, the Independent Counsel, relying on cases such 
as United States v. Nixon [citation omitted] and 
Branzburq v. Haves [citation omitted], urges that 
privileges be strictly construed because they are 
inconsistent with the paramount judicial goal of truth 
seeking. But both Nixon and Branzburq dealt with the 
creation of privileges not recognized by the common law, 
whereas here we deal with one of the oldest recognized 
privileges in the law. And we are asked, not simply to 
"construe" the privilege, but to narrow it, contrary to 
the weight of the existing body of case law. 
Id. at 2087-88, emphasis added. The Court then upheld the 
attorney-client privilege and reversed the Court of Appeals. 
It is obvious from the Swidler case that the attorney-client 
privilege must not be "narrowed," even to accomplish the goal of 
seeking out truth. As the Court explained, balancing the 
importance of desired information against a client's interests is 
improper. 
In this case, all of the conversations at issue with 
Appellant's former attorneys were performed after litigation had 
commenced and dealt with that litigation. The attorney-client 
privilege must continue even after a lawsuit ends (and even after 
the death of the client). In this case, the facts are even more 
compelling because the custody issues involved in the original 
divorce case are still very much alive. As indicated in the 
previous Brief filed with this Court, both Appellant and her ex-
husband acknowledged in their depositions that custody of the 
children was still very much a contested, ongoing issue. 
The reasons for Judge Young's ruling were clearly expressed in 
the ruling. However, the possibility of impeachment does not 
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outbalance or outweigh the attorney-client privilege. Judge Young 
relied on that and Rule 504 to support his decision. He did not 
rely upon Rule 507 and even if he did without stating so, it was 
not Appellant's intent to ever waive her privilege. This is 
evidenced by the fact that she repeatedly indicated her intent to 
preserve the privilege during her deposition and the fact that 
prior to any statements being made, a continuing objection was 
entered by her counsel. Even if it had not been, all objections 
are reserved until the time of trial and as is specifically pointed 
out in the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 507, 
Once disclosure of privileged material has occurred, 
although confidentiality cannot be restored, the purpose 
of the privilege may still be served in some instances by 
preventing use of the privilege against the holder of the 
privilege. 
(Emphasis added). For all of these reasons, Appellant urges this 
Court to reverse the order granting Appellee's Motion to Compel. 
CONCLUSION 
Utah statutory law specifically indicates that the attorney-
client privilege must be "preserved inviolate" and that "an 
attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined as 
to any communication made by the client to him or his advice given 
regarding the communication." Recent case law has emphasized the 
importance of this right, that it should not be narrowed, and that 
because of the "importance" of the privilege, it is improper to 
balance the importance of the information sought against the 
client's interests. This Court has previously held that the facts 
of each case should be reviewed to determine what the client 
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intended, and the facts of this case clearly indicate that 
Appellant and her counsel intended to preserve her attorney-client 
privilege. She indicated repeatedly what her intent was in the 
deposition, her counsel entered a continuing objection before any 
statements were made, and she moved for a protective order when her 
attorney's depositions were sought. Judge Young erred in his 
ruling, both for the reasons he specifically relied upon and for 
the reasons Appellee suggests he should have based the ruling on. 
For all of these reasons, the order granting Appellee1s motion to 
compel Appellant's former attorneys to testify was improper, and 
should be reversed. 
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Q. Okay. And can you tell me as much as 
recall about the conversation, what he 
you said 
A. 
custody 
what 
and 
made 
out 
did 
my 
to him. 
said 
He just told me that if I didn't 
that he would tell the kids as 
to 
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you 
you and 
give him 
they got 
past was, my mother and my brother, 
asked him not to. He said to give 
Q. Was there anything prior to 
me. 
older 
I cried 
him custody. 
the time 
that threat that he said to you or did 
of the blue? 
A. 
Q. 
you 
A. 
Q. 
several 
you? 
over 
made 
A. 
Q. 
the 
A. 
Q. 
to 
A. 
Q. 
He just told me that. 
And other than crying and asking 
say anything else about it? 
No. 
Yet after that conversation 
it 
him 
that he 
just come 
not to, 
you still went to 
hearings and attempted to get custody, 
Yes, I did. 
In fact, you fought him for 
issue of custody, didn't you? 
Yes, I did. 
several 
And did you talk to anyone about 
you? 
I don't recall if I did. I don't 
the 
didn't 
months 
threat 
recall. 
Did you talk to your attorney about the 
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1 threat that he made to you? 
2 MR. SCHWAB: Wait a minute. Don't answer 
3 that. You have no right to know what she's talked to me 
4 about. I am instructing you not to answer. 
5 Q. (Mr. Kelly) At the time that he made the 
6 threat you had legal counsel, Utah Legal Aid. Correct? 
7 A. Yes. 
8 MR. SCHWAB: Are you talking about me or 
9 Legal Aid? 
10 MR. KELLY: I am talking about Legal Aid. 
11 MR. SCHWAB: Okay. 
12 [Exhibit No. 28 Marked for identification.] 
13 Q. (Mr. Kelly) I am handing you what has been 
14 marked as Exhibit 28. Have you seen this document 
15 before? 
16 A. I don't know if I have or not. 
17 Q. You understood that your ex-husband, Steve 
18 Norcross, filed a divorce complaint against you shortly 
19 after the protective order hearing in January of 1994. 
20 Correct? 
21 A. Yes. 
22 Q. And shortly after that hearingf as I 
23 understand it, at the hearing Stewart Ralphs came up and 
24 asked for a recess in the hearing. Correct? 
25 A. Yes. 
Page 164 
1 Q. And you went out into the hall and spoke with 
2 him? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 Q. And what did you say to him and what did he 
5 say to you at that time? 
6 A. He just asked me, he said, "You didn't know 
7 your husband had all those records?" 
8 And I said, "No, I didn't have any idea." 
9 And he said that he would go in and stand by 
10 my side, or whatever on my behalf, and ask that they not 
11 be read, and that they hold off until I can get an 
12 attorney. And the judge said, "No," that it was already 
13 started and they would have to let her finish. 
14 Q. I want to continue to focus on that 
15 conversation you had with Mr. Ralphs. How long did that 
16 last? 
17 A. A few minutes, two minutes, maybe a few 
18 minutes. 
19 Q. Do you recall him saying anything else to you 
20 or you saying anything else to him? 
21 MR. SCHWAB: Just a minute. The problem that 
22 I have got with this, Keith, is you are clearly going 
23 into things that are prohibited by attorney/client 
24 privilege. My recollection of the law on this is that 
25 the attorney cannot waive the attorney/client privilege 
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1 MR. SCHWAB: Let's take a break. 
2 [Recess]. 
3 MR. SCHWAB: Back on the record. I have 
4 explained ray understanding of the attorney/client 
5 privilege to my client, also I explained my 
6 understanding of the potential of waiving that. There 
7 are certainly some things she doesn't mind if you know 
8 but as with any attorney/client privilege that there are 
9 certainly things that she would rather be kept between 
10 her and her attorney. For that reason she has decided 
11 to assert the attorney/client privilege as to all 
12 conversations between her and her counsel. 
13 MR. KELLY: We could do it a couple of ways. 
14 I think that by bringing this lawsuit and alleging what 
15 she alleges as damages she has waived the privilege for 
16 her attorneys in her divorce action because she is 
17 alleging she made decisions, she was damaged by the 
18 records coming out, and so I think it is clearly 
19 relevant, and I can ask some questions. You can assert 
20 the privilege or not assert the privilege as you choose, 
21 but what I am understanding you to say is if I ask any 
22 questions about communications she had with attorneys 
23 who helped her in her divorce action you will assert 
24 attorney/client privilege; is that correct? 
25 MR. SCHWAB: That is correct. Although we 
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1 respect your opinion, we disagree with it. I believe any 
2 conversations with an attorney, whether it be in the 
3 current litigation or previous litigationf is still 
4 protected by the attorney/client privilege. If I am 
5 wrong, then I guess we will let the judge tell me I am 
6 wrong but as for this deposition, we are asserting that 
7 privilege and she will not be talking about those 
8 conversations. 
9 MR. KELLY: Well, for purposes of creating a 
10 record to make it clear for the Court what kind of 
11 questions I would be asking, I will ask the questions 
12 and I assume you will object to them. So when I say 
13 making a record, if the judge is going to rule on that 
14 issue of the privilege, in the context of he would want 
15 to know what kind of questions are going to be asked. 
16 MR. SCHWAB: That's fine. Maybe to save some 
17 time, rather than having me object after each question, 
18 I will just state that in order not to waive the 
19 attorney/client privilege we don't feel that we can talk 
20 about any conversations between Crystal and her 
21 attorney, especially regarding the divorce litigation 
22 that you are talking about. So rather than objecting 
23 after each question, you might want to read a list of 
24 the questions that you would ask. 
25 Q. (Mr. Kelly) Okay. We talked about the 
Page 184 
1 your husband against you. Correct? 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. And it refers to an attorney named Susan 
4 Dyer. It says, "Comes now Susan Dyer, and hereby 
5 accepts service of the Complaint for Divorce and Summons 
6 in the above entitled action but reserves the right to 
7 answer or otherwise plead to said Complaint." Do you 
8 see that? 
9 A. Yes. 
10 Q. And isn't it true that you authorized Ms. 
11 Dyer to accept service of that divorce complaint? 
12 A. Yes. 
13 Q. So prior to the time that she signed this 
14 document, you had met with her and you knew she was 
15 going to be your attorney? 
16 A. Yes. 
17 Q. And did she tell you that your husband was 
18 going to file a divorce complaint? 
19 A. I am sure she did, yes. 
20 Q. And what were the concerns that you had at 
21 that time in the divorce action? 
22 A. I didn't want to lose my kids. I told her I 
23 wanted my children. 
24 Q. Did you care whether you got a divorce? 
25 A. No, I wanted a divorce but I didn't ask for 
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1 the divorce. 
2 Q. And at that time is it accurate to say that 
3 you were still having an intimate relationship with Mr. 
4 Birmingham? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. Was he living with you or— 
7 A. No. 
8 Q. But he came and stayed with you overnight I 
9 assume; is that correct? 
10 A. Yes. 
11 Q. So you were— in terms of the divorce at the 
12 time that the complaint was filed, you were happy to 
13 move on with life and get a divorce, it was just that 
14 you wanted the kids? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. And at that time, how old were your children? 
17 How old was Cameron? 
18 A. Five, I believe, and Stevie was three. 
19 Q. And was Cameron in kindergarten or was he 
20 still a preschooler at the time? 
21 A. Preschool. 
22 Q. I am sorry? 
23 A. Preschool. 
24 Q. And just to clarify it at this point on the 
25 record, when was Cameron's birthday? 
Page 195 
1 A. He didn't say he would tell them that day, he 
2 said he would tell them when they understood. 
3 Q. So, in any event, did he say anything else 
4 that you recall during that discussion back in early 
5 1994? 
6 A. You asked me that and I said no. 
7 Q. Okay. 
8 MR. SCHWAB: Let's take a break for a minute. 
9 I need to make a phone call. 
10 [Recess]. 
11 EXAMINATION, continued: 
12 Q. (Mr. Kelly) Okay. We were going through 
13 some points on Exhibit 29 about the proceedings in your 
14 divorce case and we were talking about September 29, 
15 1994, service of some document requests and other 
16 information. Were you doing things at this time to 
17 assist your attorney in preparing for trial, such as 
18 talking to potential witnesses, or trying to prepare 
19 things that you could use to support your custody 
20 arguments? 
21 A. Probably, yes. 
22 Q. And in your lawsuit, in your divorce lawsuit 
23 at that time and, in fact, throughout the time period 
24 from the time you answered the complaint through the end 
25 of September, you were seeking to keep your kids and 
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1 keep them in your marital home, weren't you? 
2 A. Yes, I was. 
3 Q. For you to have possession of the home and be 
4 able to live there with your kids. Right? 
5 A. But I was also afraid of the fact that my 
6 husband was going to tell my children and I thought 
7 about that since the day that it happened, and I 
8 discussed it with my attorney and she told me if I ever 
9 gave up custody of my children there would probably be 
10 no way to get them back. So I was fighting with the 
11 pros and cons of protecting them from what he would say 
12 or knowing that I would never have my kids. 
13 Q. And as of the time that you, at least through 
14 the end of September you were going forward to keep your 
15 marital home and to keep the kids, and have custody of 
16 the kids; is that right? 
17 A. Yes. 
18 Q. And during this time period he had temporary 
19 visitation rights along with you having temporary 
20 custody. Correct? 
21 A. Yes, that's right. 
22 Q. And during that period of time did he do 
23 anything objectionable in regards to his dealings with 
24 the children while he had visitation rights? 
25 A. I don't believe so. There was week ends when 
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1 A. Yes. 
2 Q. Did she discuss with you that because of your 
3 protective order complaint that there might be an 
4 argument that you had waived or given up the privilege 
5 to hold those documents as being private? 
6 A* No. 
7 MR. SCHWAB: Hold on just a second. I think 
8 in my mind you have crossed the line. I have been 
9 trying to be as lax as I could for the sake of moving 
10 this case forward letting you talk about what she and 
11 her attorney discussed as far as procedural matters. I 
12 believe the question crosses the line and gets into the 
13 merits of what they were discussing regarding the case 
14 and strategy. I believe that crosses the line. In 
15 addition to the attorney/client privilege, I don't think 
16 that's an appropriate question. 
17 Q. (Mr. Kelly) Are you going to follow your 
18 counsel's advice on that point? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 Q. And in looking at page 4 and page 5, I an 
21 just going to read a couple of statements that are made 
22 by the opposing attorney, the very last paragraph at the 
23 bottom of page 4 of Exhibit 30, writes in "Rule 
24 506(d)(1) states in the relevant part," and I think it 
25 is referring to the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
